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Introduction 
Over the past decade there have been very large increases in the 
amounts of formal agricultural credit made available in rrost non-centrally 
planned, low-income countries (LICs). Major efforts also have been aimed 
at channelling a significant part of these loans to the rural poor. As a 
result, rrost low-income countries currently have at least one small farmer 
credit program. These programs have been strongly supported by the World 
Ban1c, regional ban1cs, the Food and Agriculture Organization, various bi-
lateral aid agencies, foundations, cooperative organizations, and even 
church groups. 
The recent popularity of srm.11 farmer credit programs sterns from a 
variety of factors. In a few cases it appears that these programs have been 
used to gain political and ideological support, and to advertise government 
concern for the rural poor; credit programs give an aura of action which 
rm.y or rm.y not be associated with significant economic changes. A few Latin 
American countries also have apparently substituted credit activities for 
more fundamental changes in asset ownership and access to social services 
in rural areas. On some occasions, aid agencies also have found it relatively 
easy to transfer large amounts of foreign exchange into a country for agri-
cultural credit projects. It is much easier, for example, to rrove 10 million 
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dollars through assistance pipelines into agricultural credit, than to 
build 10 million dollars worth of rural schools. Some planners also have 
viewed loans as a vital input which is often missing in the production 
processes of srrall farmers. It has been widely held that large increases 
in forrml credit for srrall fa.r.rrers will be needed before their agricul-
tural production can be substantially increased. 
A surprisingly large number of these srrall fa.r.rrer credit programs 
have been carefully evaluated. In sorre cases loan repayrrent problems 
have been serious, and in a few programs weak administration has led to 
unsatisfactory results. Overall, however, these project evaluations show 
that many projects have been highly successful in achieving project goals. 
Despite these successful projects, the "sense of the whole" I get from 
looking at rural financial markets (RFMs) in a number of LICs is that these 
markets are performing very poorly: In a few countries the purchasing 
power of forrml credit portfolios has declined the past few years, and 
forrml RFMs continue to strongly resist lending to agriculture in general 
and to the rural poor in particular. 1 The average term structure of loans 
to agriculture is typically very short, and forrml RFMs rrobilize very little 
voluntary private savings. Some repayment problems appear to be almost a 
chronic issue as long as forrml lenders atterrpt to lend to individuals who 
;, . have lkittle previous forrml loan experience. In addition, it appears that 
forrml lenders are irrposing relatively large loan transaction costs on small 
and inexperienced borrowers. These transaction costs lessen the incentives 
1 The term "forrml credit" is used here to represent loans from banks, coop-
eratives, savings and loans, and other government regulated financial in-
stitutions. Infornal lenders are all others who provide financial loans. 
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which small and new borrowers have to use fornnl loans. Overall, it 
appears that RFM activities in most low-income countries are causing 
substantial increases in the concentration of income and asset ownership, 
a result clearly inconsistent with the stated objectives of most srrall 
farmer credit programs. 
The conundrum of moderately successful credit projects, yet flound-
ering rural financial rrarkets, can be at least partly explained by looking 
at the assumptions and policies on which rural credit programs are built. 
I will attempt to argue that fixed, relatively low interest rate policies 
in most LICs, combined with serious inflation pressures, are rrajor factors 
causing poor performance in RFMs. 
Common Assumptions and Policies 
At first blush a casual observer is often impressed with the unique-
ness of RFMs in each low-income country. This impression is often rein-
forced by the diversity found among the institutions providing financial 
services in rural areas. More careful analysis, however, reveals a large 
number of similar assumptions behind most forrral agricultural credit acti-
vities. At the farm-household level, it is often assumed that the rural 
poor face credit shortages, that they pay exorbitant amounts for the use 
of inforrr:al credit, and that they need careful supervision in order to use 
credit wisely. It is further assumed that rrost farmers need additional 
credit in order to adopt new, highly profitable technology, and that con-
cessional interest rates are needed on forrr:al loans in order to induce 
farmers to borrow. In rrost cases it is also assumed that interest charges 
rrake up the bulk of the borrowing costs for rrost farmers, and that the loan 
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demand, especially among small farmers, is very interest rate elastic. 
Typically, a rural household is also stereotyped as having little or no 
voluntary savings capacity. 
Several strongly held assumptions relate to lender behavior. These 
include the feeling that informal lenders provide the majority of the 
loanable funds in most low-income countries, and that formal lenders are 
tradition bound and do not necessarily make loans wisely. It also is 
assurred that formal lenders can regulate the uses made of funds by grant-
ing loans only for production purposes, or by rraking loans in-kind. Many 
lenders as well as policy makers also feel that formal credit should not 
be extended for household consumption. 
Strongly held assumptions about informal lenders also can be found. 
These include the ubiquitous feeling that moneylenders usually extract 
large rronopoly profits, charge exorbitant interest rates, regularly take 
advantage of the economically weak, do not provide legitimate economic 
services, and that they ougpt to be closely regulated or eliminated. 
There are also a number of widely held assumptions about the overall 
performance of RFMs in low-income countries. One of the most corrmon is 
that RFMs can be closely regulated and their performance controlled by 
administrative fiat. It is very common for new governments to announce 
dramatic agricultural credit programs which typically include credit supply 
increases as well as concessional interest terms. In a few cases it may 
also include forgiveness of formal debts not repaid under earlier programs. 
As migtit be expected, these common assumptions have led to very similar 
policies across countries. Most countries, for exarr:ple, try to drive 
.. 
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C the infornnl moneylender from rural areas by increasing formal loan 
supplies. A nurr:ber of countries also are developing new financial insti-
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tutions to service specific target groups in rural areas, especially the 
small fa...nr.er. Also, intensive loan supervision and farm planning often 
are tied to small fa.mer loan programs. It is very comm::m for central 
banks or r:nnetary authorities to use various types of credit regulations 
to force lenders to service certain target groups such as small fa.rrrers. 
These regJ.lations include loan portfolio-ceiling devices, various discount 
mechanisTIE, adjustments in reserve requirements, and loan guarantee pro-
grams [Joh...'iSon]. Fixed, low interest rates on both formal loans and 
financial savings instruJIEnts are probably the most common policy instru-
ment found in LICs. It is becoming increasingly apparent that these con-
cessional, inflexible interest rate policies are a major reason why most 
RFMs are performing so poorly. 
Arguments for Low Interest Rates 
Various combinations of at least four arguments are used to justify 
low and i:-i.:~lexible interest rate policies in RFMs. The most commn is 
that low rates are needed to induce fa.rrrers to adopt forrral credit and to 
use same to purchase modem productive inputs. This adoption argument 
holds tha~ small farmers will not borrow formal credit unless low rates 
are chargej, that they will not adopt profitable new technology unless 
special inducements are given, and that low rates are necessary to offset 
the uncertainties associated with adoption of new production activities. 
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A second and more complicated argurrent is that low interest rates are 
needed on agricultural credit to compensate farrrers for other economic 
policies which cause production and investrrent disincentives. These pol-
icies m_i..ght include food price ceilings, overvalued foreign exchange rates 
which depress prices of agricultural exports, various forms of taxes, 
and policies which raise the prices of rrajor inputs purchased by fa.rrrers. 
Some policy makers argue that low interest rates on agricultural loans are 
an easy and efficient way to compensate farrrers for the production disin-
centives inflicted on them by these various policies. 
A third argument used to justify cheap credit policies, especially 
for small farrrers, relates to equity or incorre transfer objectives. Policy 
rra.kers who feel compassion for the economic plight of the rural poor argue 
that low interest rates on agricultural loans are an easy way to transfer 
additional purchasing power to the rural poor. When interest rates are 
low, borrowers pay less for their loans and thus have more income to spend 
on other activities. A slight variation of this argument is that low in-
terest rates are justified to help farmers ride out periods of low income 
due to disasters caused by war or weather. 
The fourth argument might be labelled the "moneylender syndrorre." 
It is widely held in LICs that informal lenders apply usurious lending 
tenns to their loans. These terms lead to either perpetual economic bond-
age of borrower to lender, or even worse, turnover of borrowers' assets 
to the lender to satisfy debts. An objective of many small farmer credit 
programs is to provide inexpensive formal credit to rural households so 
they can escape the clutches of the mJneylender. It is also o~en hoped 
.. 
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C that an increased supply of inexpensive for.rral credit will at least weaken 
the economic power of the moneylenders, and hopefully even drive them 
out of business. 
Recent Research Results 
A substantial amount of research has been done the past few years on 
rural financial markets. Results from a good deal of this research chal-
lenges many of the widely held assumptions about RFMs in LICs. This re-
search is also raising serious questions about the efficacy of concessional 
interest rate policies which are largely based on these increasingly ques-
tionable assumptions. 
Hyun, Kalla, Kato, I..ee, Ong and Roberts, for example, have all argued 
that voluntary rural savings capacities nay be very substantial in LICs, 
even where per capita incomes are quite low. 2 Wai has pointed out that 
the availability of financial instruments along with attractive interest 
incentives can be very irr:portant in helping RFMs to rrobilize these savings. 
Singh, Stitzlein and Barton have argued that many infor.rral lenders 
provide valuable services in rural areas of LICs. Further, that on the 
average, these services are reasonably priced. They would also likely ar-
gue that financial programs which are aimed at driving wicked moneylenders 
from rural areas are ill-conceived. 
Other research by Meyer, Tinnerrreier, Adams and Howse also suggests 
that additional credit and supervision may not be critical in the production 
activities of many small farmers in LICs. They report that many of these 
2 Studies cited are listed a1phabetically by author's nam2 in the Bibliogr>aphy. 
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rural households already own enough liquidity, or can borrow enough 
from informal sources, to capitalize on highly profitable investment op-
portunities. A number of other researchers have carried out farm level 
analysis which indicates that m:my small farrrers in LICs cannot profit-
ably use additional credit in combination with their current bundle of 
resources. Still other researchers have reported that loans to help 
stabilize household consumption a.rrong the rural poor nay be more irr:por-
tant than so called "production credit" for these sane households. 
Researchers have levelled even stronger criticism at the conces-
sional interest rate policies. They have pointed out that rates of in-
flation which exceed the nominal rates of interest paid on financial 
debts, and result in negative real rates of interest, cause havoc in fi-
nancial rrarkets. Sorre countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile 
have had very long periods in which real rates of interest in formal 
RFMs were almost always negative. During the past 5 years almost all 
LICs have experienced rates of inflation which resulted in negative 
real interest rates on most formal rural financial instruments. Despite 
double digit inflation, very few LICs have adjusted sigp.ificantly their 
rates of interest on financial instruments in the past 5 years. Researchers 
are showing that these negative real rates of interest have a very adverse 
effect on the operations of RFMs. These adverse effects can be seen at 
the farm-household level, the lender level, and at the overall, financial 
market level. 
Farm-Household Level 
Low or negative real rates of interest have a double effect on farm-
households. The first effect of low rates is to induce some households, 
-, 
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C who a.re lucky enough to have access to low cost credit, to overuse these 
loans. Recent farm level research in Brazil showed that m:my large 
farrrers who had ample access to formal credit had loans far in excess of 
their cash operating needs [Adams and others]. A good deal of the ITDney 
borrowed by these individuals was obviously being diverted to uses out-
side those authorized by their agricultural production loans. 
The second effect of low interest rates lies on the savings side. 
In ITDst cases low interest rates on credit force financial interrrEdiaries 
and ITDnetary authorities to set even lower rates on financial savings. 
Almost all market-oriented countries in the world currently have negative 
real rates of interest on ITDst financial savings instrurrBnts available 
to the rural poor. As Kane has pointed out, low interest rates on sav-
ings are particularly onerous on the poor. These low rates force rural 
households to accept erosion of the real value of their financial savings 
or to hold their savings in other asset forms. This also results in rural 
households receiving a lower rate of return on their total assets. Sav-
ings activities are, as a result, made less attractive to the household 
and the opportunity costs of consumption lessened. Said another way, poor 
rural households are induced to consume more and save less through low 
interest rate policies. 
Lender Level 
As suggested earlier, low interest rates on agricultural credit a.re 
o~en justified on the basis of what they do for, or to the rural poor. 
Policy makers alITDst always overlook the effects which these concessional 
interest rate policies have on the activities of formal lenders. This is 
' sorrewhat surprising once one recognizes that much of the mischief caused 
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by concessional interest rate policies occurs in the distortions it 
causes in lender behavior. Gonzalez-Vega, for exarrple, has recently 
argued that concessional interest rates force lenders to concentrate 
their loan portfolios in the hands of large and experienced borrowers. 
He also argues that concessional interest rates discourage loans to 
agriculture in general and loans for mediwn and long-term. Research in 
Brazil by Adams and Tommy strongly supported Gonzalez-Vega's thesis. 
They found that small farmers in one area of Southern Brazil received 
very little of the sharp increases in formctl credit experienced in Brazil 
during the late 1960's. 
Low interest rates on financial deposits also make it very difficult 
for formctl financial institutions to TIDbilize a substantial part of their 
loanable funds from voluntary private savings in rural areas. These 
lenders typically must rely heavily on funds provided by a central bank 
to meet TIDst of their loans needs. Too many for:rml rural financial insti-
tutions are simply retail outlets for central banks. Often the word 
quickly gets around that the money being lent to farmers is President, or 
General "So and So's" money. A feeling regularly emerges a.rrong borrowers 
that, since the loan is "government money," there is little need to repay. 
In ITDst countries it is socially acceptable to be lax in meeting one's 
financial obligations with government. Loan repayment problems are often 
much less severe where a significant part of the loanable funds are owned 
by local savers. It is less socially acceptable to be lax in meeting fi-
nancial obligations with one's friends or neighbors. 
When concessional interest rates are in effect on loans, lenders often 
find that loan demand exceeds the supply of loanable funds. The lenders 
-. 
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C are forced to use nonprice rationing to allocate the scarce funds. This 
typically emerges in three forms. The first is to allocate fixed Joan 
quotas on the basis of how Imlch land a borrower has in a particular en-
teq:irise. This might be expressed in money terms like one thousand pesos 
per hectare of rice, in physical terms like 600 pounds of chemical fer-
tilizer per hectare of rice, or some combination of money and physical 
inputs. Under this fixed quota scheme some borrower may end up with too 
much or too little money or physical input. 
c 
The second technique of allocating concessionally priced credit is 
for the lender to place heavy emphasis on collateral or the borrower's 
credit rating. This results in the lender extending loans mainly to 
large landowners and to borrowers with whom the lender has previous 
lending experiences. New borrowers and persons with small amounts of 
collateral are generally denied formal loans under these criteria. 
The third way lenders ration credit is rrore subtle and less obvious 
to the casual observer of RFMs. This rationing is done by imposing dif-
ferent loan transaction costs on various classes of borrowers. If the 
borrower already has a satisfactory track record with the lender, borrows 
large amounts, and provides the lender with ample collateral, the bor-
rower's loan transaction costs o~en make up a very small proportion of 
total borrowing costs. The borrower may be able to negotiate a new loan 
through a sirrple telephone call to the lender. In this case the borrow-
ing costs are made up alrrost entirely by the interest payments made on the 
loans [Adams and Nehman]. 
Typically, an inexperienced candidate for a srr.all loan finds that a 
forma.l lender will give him or her Imlch rrore hassle in the loan negotiation 
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process. 'Ibis usually includes meeting with the lender a nurrber of tirrEs 
to corrplete loan negotiations and repayrrent, long waits in line for the 
potential borrower, incurring cash expenses for paperwork and forms, 
and in some cases paying a bribe. Many times the loan candidate may ex-
perience substantial amounts of loan transaction costs and then be denied 
a formal loan. Even if the loan is approved, the sma.11 borrower ma.y 
find that loan transaction costs far exceed the interest charges on the 
loan. Their total borrowing costs on forma.l loans ma.y be so high that 
informal loans at "usurious" interest rates, but with little or no addi-
tional loan transaction costs, ma.y be less expensive! In all too ma.ny 
cases it appears that forma.l lenders irrpose unnecessary loan transaction 
costs on srrall and inexperienced loan candidates as a way of discouraging 
unprofitable business. 
Overall Effects 
In addition to affecting lender and farm-household behavior, conces-
sional interest rate policies also have profund effects on the overall 
performa.nce of RFMs. Most of the poor performa.nce of RFMs in LICs cited 
earlier is a direct result of ill-advised concessional interest rate pol-
icies combined with substantial amounts of inflation. Three aspects of 
this poor performa.nce merit additional discussion. These are the income 
distribution effects, the effects on efficiency of resource allocation, 
and the increased opportunities for corruption. 
Vogel, Gonzalez-Vega and Kane have recently shown that concessional 
interest rate policies can seriously distort income and asset ownership 
distributions. The work by Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega on Costa Rica is par-
ticularly revealing. In 1948, Costa Rica nationalized rrost of its banking 
-. 
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C, system. The governrrent has s:ince placed a good deal of errphasis on pro-
vid:ing credit to s:rrall farrrers. D=spite this, it appears that for:rral 
rural credit distribution in Costa Rica is more heavily skewed than is 
landownership! Research on the performance of nationalized RFMs in India 
suggest similar dissappo:int:ing results [Agrawal]. It appears to be 
extrerrely difficult to provide financial services to the rural poor even 
when for:rral lenders are nationalized. 
Although largely ignored by researchers, it appears that RFMs may 
also play an important role in concentrating incorres in certa:in sectors 
or regions. Kato is one of the few researchers to docl.lm2nt how financial 
markets transfer resources between sectors over relatively long periods 
of tirre. His work on Japan showed that very large amounts of voluntary 
savings were transferred from rural areas to urban by financial markets. 
It appears that this same process is continuing in :rrany of the LICs. 
Recent work in Thailand, Bangladesh and Jamaica reinforces my impression 
that when real rates of interest in financial markets are close to zero 
or negative, low :incorre regions of an economy are drained of their f:inan-
cial savings by financial markets. 
Shaw and McKinnon have pointed out that interest rate regulations 
frag;rent financial markets and cause very serious distortions in resource 
allocation. Sorre borrowers have access to too much credit, others are 
forced to take too much credit in-k:ind, and still others who migtit have 
productive uses for credit are denied access to for:rral loans. As suggested 
earlier, :rrany households nay be encouraged to warp their asset portfolio 
holdings because of concessional interest rate policies. In a few countries 
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like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (until recently), large amounts of funds 
borrowed for agricultural purposes have been siphoned off into other eco-
nomic activities which may have relatively low payoffs for society. In 
some countries, financial institutions have been overbuilt in order to 
roobilize inexpensive rural deposits. Unfortunately, almost no work has 
been done on measuring the rragnitude of these inefficiencies. 
Likewise, alrmst no research has been done on the susceptibility to 
corruption which concessional interest rates rray introduce into financial 
rrarkets. As Blair points out, the larrent that large farmers are able to 
capture most of the concessionally priced credit in cooperatives around 
the world is a dimension of this subtle corruption. Big people always 
seem to elbow out little people when bargains are being passed 
tively priced credit is often the best bargain around in rural 
LICs. It is little wonder that rrany cooperatives which handle 
out. 
areas 
loans 
Nega-
of 
do 
not function properly when a small number of powerful individuals can cap-
ture most of the concessionally priced loans and thus most of the useful 
services which the institution provides to society. What incentive does 
the little person have to become involved? 
The Wall Street Journal and Fortune Magazine have recently featured 
articles about this corruption on a much grander scale. In several low-
incorn= countries the availability of large amounts of concessionally priced 
credit, plus some high level pressure to channel these funds to friends 
of the regime, have rrade a few people in these countries very wealthy, 
very quickly. Concessional interest rate policies corrbined with inflation 
create very large implied income subsidies to borrowers. These subsidies 
are allocated by the financial system to borrowers in proportion to the 
~ 
' 
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anrnmt of TIDney borrowed. As suggested earlier, it is in the interest of 
the lenders to concentrate these loans in order to minimize lender costs. 
When loans are negatively priced, it is very much in the interest of the 
economically and politically powerful to get as much of the concessionally 
priced loans as possible. The beautiful part about this whole process is 
that the "robbery" of the public is done entirely legally. (Why radical 
intellectuals in capitalist societies have not jumped on this issue 
puzzles me. ) 
Policy Adjustments 
I have become firmly convinced that ITDst small fa.:rrrer credit projects 
and RFM activities in general in LICs are not helping significantly to 
resolve problems of rural poverty. In most cases RFJVI activities, under 
current policies, are a welfare program for the politically and economic-
ally powerful. It is also clear that a nwrber of the so-called "success-
ful" small farrrer credit programs are not successful if appropriate social 
criteria are used to evaluate project perforrrance. The rural poor are 
not materially aided by a credit project which draws most of its new 
clients from the loan portfolios of other formal lenders [Adams, 1966]. 
The rural poor are also not aided materially if a srrall farmer credit pro-
gram's loan repayment performance is improved by switching loans from small 
to medium and large sized borrowers. A small farmer credit project also 
should not be judged a success when it provides a few nickles to the rural 
poor while the rest of the financial system pours millions into loans for 
the economically powerful. A project should only be counted successful in 
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serving the rural poor if substantial "additionality" is not achieved. 
That is, a substantial increase in the amount lent to the rural poor and 
number of poor serviced by the RFM in total must occur. 
The persistence of the concessional interest rate policies, despite 
a good deal of evidence that they are anti-developmental, cannot be ex-
plained by conventional neo-classical economics. I am becoming increas-
ingly convinced that interest rate reforms are as difficult to effect as 
land reform. They ITE.Y be even more difficult, in fact, because the 
people injured by current interest rate policies are only hurt a small 
amount each. Land invasions are possible to pressure land reform. 
Nothing similar seems possible to build grass roots pressure for interest 
rate reform. 
It is clear to me that RFMs in LICs are not being used properly to 
achieve widely-held development goals, especially those related to equity. 
In large part this is due to incorrect policies built on faulty assump-
tions. I am firmly convinced that far too much emphasis is currently 
placed on providing formal production credit at concessional interest 
rates to sITE.11 farmers. I also feel that inforITE.l RFMs can play a much 
rrore positive role in rural development than is generally recognized. 
A rrore enlightened approach, I feel, would be to place much heavier 
emphasis on using RFMs to mobilize voluntary financial savings in early 
stages of development. More flexible interest rate policies will be 
needed to facilitate this. Savers must be offered positive real rates 
of interest on their deposits, secure and convenient places to deposit, 
and easy and quick access to their deposits if they want to ITE.ke withdrawals. 
-17-
It would also be useful to mount major savings mobilization programs 
once interest rate policies are appropriate. A larger nurrber of rural 
poor would benefit from attractive savings facilities than can benefit 
from realistically priced credit. 
At the same time, I would institute flexible, nominal interest 
rates on agricultural credit so that positive real rates of interest 
would be expected in most years. These higher and more flexible rates 
would discourage current large users of credit, stimulate forrral lenders 
to seek out new loan business among the rural poor, and force lenders 
to reduce loan transaction costs imposed on small and new borrowers in 
order to attract more loan business. Small and new borrowers may even 
find that their total borrowing costs were reduced when higher and more 
flexible interest rates are in force. 
The adjustments in interest rate policies will not be the only 
change needed to make small fa.rrrer credit projects more successful. I 
strongly feel, however, that without substantial changes in current as-
sumptions and policies, major improvements in the perforrrance of RFMs 
will be impossible. 
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